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AUTHOR’S NOTE 
 
 I spent last year living in a neighborhood of Paris, France that 
experienced peaceful (but noisy) protests that shut down the area as often as 
twice a month. After a while, I began to wonder, “Who goes to these 
things?” This work attempts to answer that question. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
People participate in politics in democratic societies. Though this is a 
tautology, it has, nevertheless, an important meaning. “Democracy” means 
“government by the people...fit[ting] the etymology of the term: demos, the 
people, and kratein, to rule” (Cohen 1971, 3). Public participation is what 
makes democracies democratic. Yet, not all members of the public 
participate in the same way. 
The question of who participates and how is important both on scientific 
grounds and because of normative concerns about the quality, quantity, and 
equality of political participation (Campbell 2013). When discussing equality 
of participation, it is worthwhile to think about the three modes of political 
participation that draw distinctly different slices of the population: voting, 
civic activism, and collective action (Norris 2002, 195). Voting is a highly 
institutionalized activity, and, generally, civic activism is, too. Since these take 
place within an organized structure, it is possible to address equality concerns 
through laws and regulations. Collective action, on the other hand, is a non-
institutionalized form of political participation. It is a form of participation 
that is only available to some people, those with motivation and time 
(Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010). 
Along with other forms of collective action, such as boycotts and 
petition-signing, the use of protest has been on the rise in the twentieth 
century (Norris 2002, 197). This has been especially true in Western societies 
(Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010), but it has recently risen to the fore in 
countries all over the world, from Taiwan to Venezuela. While the 
movements of recent decades are tiny in comparison to the enormous mass-
movements of the early 20th century (Koopmans 1996), they have had an 
undeniable influence on the policy and structure of government, from the 
Anti-Apartheid movement and the fall of the Berlin Wall to Occupy Wall 
Street and the Arab Spring to the recent uprising in Ukraine. 
Participation in 
collective action is 
only available to 
some people, those 
with the motivation 
and time to do so. 
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Such events as these reveal the relationship between social structure and 
political authority better than any other event, policy, or outcome (Lichbach 
1998). Protestors share a collective identity and aspire to collective goals. This 
affinity is what gives the term, “protest,” meaning. But what is beguilingly 
easy to forget about protests is that they are made up of individuals, each 
carrying their own unique identity, with their own reasons for participating. 
Thus, collective action is a meeting of two closely intertwined identities, the 
individual and the collective. The key to understanding this process is built 
upon a social psychological framework (Klandermans 1997, 2–4). 
While macro-level of explanations of protest and other forms of 
collective action can be illuminating, the key is the individual’s decision-
making process after encountering a problem. It has long been observed that 
actors, economic or otherwise, experience changing levels of performance 
(Hirschman 1970, 2). While this concept is not particularly interesting from a 
market perspective, since the loss of one actor in a competitive market only 
results in its replacement by others, it assumes importance when considering 
the performance of the state, a unique and irreplaceable actor. 
When the performance of an organization, such as the state, is believed 
to have significantly deteriorated, the individual has two options: voice or 
exit (Hirschman 1970, 4). Voice serves to alert an organization of its failings 
and urge it to reform (Hirschman 1970, 33). Exit, in the political realm, is 
synonymous with revolution, a reaction outlawed by the state as criminally 
treasonous (Hirschman 1970, 17). Exit is rooted in the feeling that 
individuals currently in power are illegitimate. When neither exit nor voice 
are exercised, the individual remains silent and accepts the state’s 
deterioration, at least for some period of time. The degree to which this 
deterioration can be tolerated is determined by the individual’s loyalty to the 
organization. If the deterioration of performance reaches an intolerable 
degree, however, citizens will be confronted with the need to choose 
between advocating for reform (voice) or revolution (exit). 
The question is, therefore, which of these two reactions does collective 
action represent? In this paper, I describe and test a model of participation 
Collective action 
unveils the relation 
between social 
structure and 
political authority. 
Faced with 
deteriorated 
performance, the 
individual can use 
exit or voice. 
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that addresses that question. This model proposes an individual’s response, 
exit or voice, is conditioned by a combination of individual attitudes, motive 
sources and mobilizing structures, and contextual factors. After briefly 
defining the term, “collective action” and summarizing three competing 
interpretations of the function of collective action, I will explore each of the 
three model components in turn. Then, using data pooled from 44 countries 
observed in the 5th (2005-2008) and 6th waves (2009-2013) of the World 
Values Survey, I will analyze this model with a series of logistic regressions to 
characterize the participants in peaceful demonstration and determine 
whether collective action is more likely to be used in voice or exit. The 
current literature on collective action would suggest that collective action is a 
tool of voice rather than exit. If this is supported by the data, I will conclude 
with some larger observations on the implications of such a finding.   
 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
A. DEFINITION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
The term for any action that aims to improve the status, power, or 
influence of a group by challenging social inequality and injustice is 
“collective action” (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009) Why “collective action” 
and not “protest” or “demonstration?” If the meaning of the latter terms is 
considered in context, they prejudge the intentions and political positions of 
the participants, generally from the unflattering perspective of the target of 
these actions: authority (Tilly and Tilly, 1981). In contrast, “collective action” 
is a value-neutral term and applies equally to actors of all motivations across 
a wide range of behavior (ibid.). 
Collective action is also a term of specificity. It is a specific response to 
specific conditions of social existence (Gurr 1970, 312). What these 
conditions are has been the subject of considerable debate over the past 
three centuries at a minimum. John Stuart Mill understood collective action 
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to be the product of strict calculation of the pursuit of individual interest (C. 
Tilly 1978, 16). Karl Marx traced collective action back to group interest and, 
unsurprisingly, conflict in the organization of production (ibid., 15). Émile 
Durkheim viewed collective action though the lens of identity, a direct 
response to the integration and disintegration of groups in society (ibid., 15-
16). Max Weber presented collective action as the product of commitment to 
certain belief systems (ibid., 17). Rather than being irreconcilable, these four 
interpretations lend themselves to a syncretic theory of mobilization, as will 
be described below.  
While “collective action” may be the best available term, it is not without 
its shortcomings. “Protest” is more explicitly political in its objectives 
(Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 128). “Social movement” is more clearly 
oriented around the opinions and beliefs of its participants and targeted 
toward change in the structure of society (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217). 
Therefore, in an attempt to address these shortcomings, I will use “collective 
action” to describe the action of assembling individuals that share opinions 
and beliefs to attempt to change the political structure of society.  
The “action” in collective action is not so broad in practice as it might 
first appear. Most people pursue collective action through a limited number 
of forms, though these can change over time (C. Tilly 1983). These forms are 
determined by political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and cultural 
frames (Lichbach 1998). The changing interests, grievances, and aspirations 
across generations are reflected in the changing forms and goals of collective 
action over time (C. Tilly 1983). Earlier repertoires of action gave ordinary 
people the opportunity to make their opinions known in the absence of 
elections, surveys, and sustained, generalist social movements (ibid.). These 
may have been in the form of more or less spontaneous reform movements, 
such as riots or violent revolutions. As institutionalized democratic processes 
strengthened and subjects increasingly became citizens, at least in Europe, in 
the early 19th century, these early forms lost favor and were used more rarely 
(ibid.). By the 20th century, some forms of collective action took on an 
increasingly institutionalized aspect (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). For 
Collective action is 
an assembly of like-
minded individuals 
trying to change 
the political 
structure of society 
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example, many of the seminal moments of the U.S. civil rights movement, 
such as the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, were the 
product of planned actions by permanent activist organizations. Today, 
collective action is generally seen as a legitimate method of political 
participation and, in the eyes of some, complementary to elections and 
surveys for understanding public opinion (ibid., C. Tilly 1983). 
 
B. THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
As described by Norris et al, there are three common interpretations of 
the meaning of collective action (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). After an 
overview of these interpretations, each will be explored in greater detail. The 
first interpretation holds that instances of collective action are dependent on 
entirely contextual conditions (ibid.). It discourages hasty generalizations, 
cautioning that the differences between collective actions may be greater than 
their similarities. Different contexts are liable to act as confounding variables 
to the point that a unitary concept of collective action becomes incoherent 
(Diani 2009). It claims that there are few qualities inherent to collective 
action that are predictive of the background of participants, so it would be a 
mistake to lump all demonstrators together (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 
2005). 
The second, more ambitious view is that collective action is essentially an 
expression of anti-state sentiment, a rejection of the status quo and a call for 
revolution. This sees collective action as a mechanism for releasing built-up 
tension between the desires of individuals and the structures of society (L. 
Tilly and Tilly 1981, 14). Alienation and dissatisfaction are the principal 
predictors of participation (Dalton 2002, 67). In this mindset, a “they” must 
be targeted and an “us” must be formed in order to create a set of collective 
The Loud and the Unhappy 
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beliefs, including the belief that collective action can address current 
inadequacies (Klandermans 1997, 17–18). 
The third and final viewpoint interprets collective action as voice, as one 
option among many in the toolkit of political engagement. This perspective 
relies less on tension and emphasizes the rational basis of social movements 
(L. Tilly and Tilly 1981, 14). It suggests participation is driven by politically 
sophisticated individuals motivated by shared convictions about politics and 
identity (Dalton 2002, 67). McGarty et al. (2009) summarizes this view by 
writing, “If this logical thread can be expressed in a single sentence then it is 
that collective action must be connected to ideas, and the political action 
must be connected to ideology, and all of these things, action, ideas, and 
ideology must be tied to collective identity.” Thus, collective action would be 
a means of advocating for rational proposals for societal reform. 
 
1. THE CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 
 
The first interpretation of collective action is more a message of caution. 
It claims that there is little inherent to demonstrations to predict 
participation, meaning it would it be mistake to place all demonstrators 
together under the banner of a sprawling theory (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 
2005). This thesis suggests that the mobilization of social groups and the 
underlying attitudes of these groups depend principally upon the specifics of 
the event (ibid.). These details include the issues, actors, processes, and 
cultural frames of the participants and they act as confounding variables in 
attempts to create models of participation (Diani 2009). 
A specific example is the predictive strength of education, occupation, 
and gender for levels of political participation. These predictors are stronger 
in countries with a communist heritage than countries that never experienced 
communist rule, a contextual historical fact that might be mistakenly omitted 
from a predictive model (Smith 2009). Some of these confounding effects 
can be taken into account, especially if they are easily measured (ibid.). Other 
The Loud and the Unhappy 
 
 10 
contextual variables, such as the practical constraints of transport and time 
and the physical danger of participation, may change so much from event to 
event that it becomes difficult to accurately consider their influence (Van 
Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Finally, the degree to which collective action may 
represent major social upheaval depends on citizen group access to the 
political regime (Diani 2009). When access is restricted, civil associations may 
radicalize, draw closer to protest groups, and increase support for collective 
action. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to account for some contextual variables. It is 
also possible that a few variables of collective action have such a strong 
predictive effect that changing context does not significantly diminish their 
power. Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider two competing, grander 
explanations of collective action. 
 
2. THE ANTI-STATE INTERPRETATION 
 
The roots of the anti-state interpretation of collective action run deep, 
having exerted dominance over political thought for centuries. In a 
celebrated quotation, the French theorist Gustave Le Bon links collective 
action with the destruction of the status quo, writing in 1895, “The rise of 
crowds marks one of the last steps…towards those periods of confused 
anarchy that always seem to need to proceed the creation of each new 
society” (6). The anti-state thesis also implies protestors hold irrational, 
immature political attitudes. Writing in 1951, Eric Hoffer explains: 
 
“For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be 
intensely discontented…they must have an extravagant conception of the prospects and 
potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved 
in their vast undertaking. Experience is a handicap” (quoted in Gamson 1975, 131). 
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For Hoffer, the participants in mass movements are dissatisfied, 
idealistic, and come from portions of the population that have had little prior 
exposure to politics. 
This view continues to be echoed in the public sphere today. For 
example, many media commentators used this lens to interpret the 
coordinated, 8-million person, 8-country demonstration against the Iraq war 
on 15 February 2003 as an attempt to undermine the American government 
rather than a protest against an American policy (Diani 2009). Therefore, the 
pervasiveness of its use and lasting attractiveness of this interpretation makes 
it worth exploring. 
The most influential political scientist to elaborate the antistate thesis is 
Ted Robert Gurr. In Gurr’s book on instability and political conflict, Why 
Men Rebel (1970), he outlines the main causal sequence of collective action. 
First, discontent develops out of a state of relative deprivation. This is a 
situation in which there is a perceived discrepancy between the expectations 
of citizens and the capabilities of their government to fulfill those 
expectations (13). This gap results in a lack of confidence in government, 
alienation toward elected representatives, and frustration with the current 
political and social system (ibid., 11). The discontent is then politicized and 
then actualized through a public demonstration of dissatisfaction (ibid., 12).  
These “civil troubles” take on three forms: turmoil, conspiracy, and 
internal war (ibid., 11). Turmoil is relatively spontaneous, unorganized 
collective action with widespread popular participation. Conspiracy is highly 
organized action with limited participation, often a military-led coup d’état. 
Internal war features both high degrees of organization and widespread 
participation. What unites these three forms of “civil troubles” are their foci: 
the structure of authority and resistance through action (Lichbach 1998). 
A good deal of political thought has gone into attempting to explain why 
individuals would be willing to participate in such action beyond the 
existence of general discontent. An explanation that has found traction, at 
least in the media, is that the willingness to participate in such episodes of 
“nonconforming” behavior comes from a deficit on the part of the 
According to the 
antistate view, 
participants are 
dissatisfied, 
idealistic, and 
inexperienced. 
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individual. The participant in these demonstrations would have acquired an 
insufficient social investment in conformist institutions and behavior, making 
it impossible to resist the nonconforming impulse to exit the system in the 
face of deterioration (Becker 1963, 27-28). 
This is perceived to be a development that is particularly prevalent on the 
left side of the political spectrum. This “hero of the New Left” is alienated 
from mainstream society and attempts to escape it through social deviance 
(Horowitz 1972, 356). This antihero “wins” by refusing to become involved 
in the traditional political process in order to preserve the freedom to 
experiment and experience without constraint. Thus, victory is not seizing 
over political power, but an anarchistic rejection of political power (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, at least for those who back the anti-state interpretation, 
this theory has not gained empirical support (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 
2005). On the contrary, political collective action often does not even have 
an anti-state character (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 27). For example, one study 
demonstrates that demonstrations on environmental or civil rights prove no 
more confrontational than conventional forms of participation (Koopmans 
1996). In addition, the alienated and dissatisfied are not disproportionately 
drawn to collective action (Dalton 2002, 68). Of course, this is not to say that 
collective action cannot be anti-state. Such events do occur, but, on their 
own, collective action can be used to infer little to nothing about threats to 
system stability (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 35). 
Notably, most studies attempting to undermine the anti-state hypothesis 
have only looked at those who express interest in attending protests, or 
protest potential (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). It is worthwhile to see 
whether this interpretation might hold among individuals who, so to say, 
walked the walk, not just talked the talk. 
!
3. THE POLITICAL RESOURCE INTERPRETATION 
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The third and most widely accepted approach interprets collective action 
as a political resource for reform. This view places collective action in the 
wider context of political engagement, as one choice among the many tools 
of political action (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 27). In this sense, the informal 
association of individuals through collective action is integral to the 
successful formulation of an active, vocal, and democratic civil society 
(Zompetti 2006). 
The political resources theory places collective action in the context of 
political strategy and claims that those who participate in these movements 
hold mainstream attitudes and social characteristics (Norris, Walgrave, and 
Aelst 2005). Over the past few decades, at least, the population willing to 
take part in collective action has normalized (Norris 2002, 200–202). In fact, 
participation in conventional political behavior is now positively correlated 
with higher protest potential, suggesting that protest behavior is an 
unexceptional part of today’s political life (Marsh and Kaase 1979a, 94). 
The “normalization” of protest means, in this sense, means that the 
profile of protestors is shifting to resemble that of the population most likely 
to engage in conventional political participation. In concrete terms, protest 
potential has long been highest among younger people (Norris 2002, 200–
202). With normalization, the middle-aged are increasingly the most strongly 
involved age group, reflecting their engagement in civic activism (ibid.). 
Collective action also enjoys the legitimacy of conventional political 
action (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). It is not just the domain of socially or 
economically marginalized minorities, but also of typical political participants 
(ibid.). One example this fact is that the participants in the Occupy Wall 
Street protests of 2011 tended to be socially-embedded individuals, not 
marginalized “hippies” (Van Stekelenburg 2012). 
Of course, the participants in collective action are still dissatisfied with 
the current state of affairs, but their unhappiness is of a more limited, 
directed form. It does not damage the individual’s relationship with societal 
structures on the whole, but focuses on a problem through the use of a 
specific set of actions. For example, the regulatory nature of institutions is 
The political 
resource 
perspective 
interprets 
collective action as 
just one tool among 
many. 
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legitimized by unemployment. When mass unemployment hits, individuals 
undertake collective action to signal the failure of market forces. Society must 
then respond through the creation an alternate, non-market, pathway for 
socialization (Piven and Cloward 1972, 7). An early case of the logical 
relationship between need, protest, and response took place in the French 
city of Lyon in the Middle Ages. Starving, impoverished rioters periodically 
overran the city until the city leaders created a standardized, centralized 
administration for welfare support (ibid., 11). In this situation, riots served as 
a means of expressing dissatisfaction with the situation, not the authorities. 
The political resource interpretation replaces Le Bon and Hoffer's notion 
of the immature protester lost in the crowd of raw emotion with a middle-
aged, politically active participant with demands rooted in basic need and 
reasoned desire. It claims that participants in collective action are as equally 
rational as other political actors. They have essentially instrumental goals and 
pursue them with methods suited to the task (Gamson 1975, 138). William 
Gamson, author of The Strategy of Social Protest, one of the first books to 
endorse the political resource interpretation, writes, “In the place of the old 
duality of extremist politics and pluralist politics, there is simply politics” 
(138). This view places collective action under the same heading as more 
conventional measures of public opinion, such as voting or surveys. 
If this is so, collective action should be seen as the expression of public 
opinion through the lens of resource management (ibid.). These resources 
include the structure of local organizations, the involvement of outside 
individuals and organizations represented by the collective action, the supply 
and demand of resources from specific movements, and the costs and 
rewards of participation (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Political scientists 
espousing the political resource interpretation claim that the influence of 
these incentivizing structures on the costs and benefits of participation is the 
key to understanding collective action as an expression of public opinion 
(ibid.).  
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III. THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The most compelling explanations of the decision to participate in 
collective action meld individual and social factors together with reference to 
contextual normative questions (Campbell 2013). Sophisticated models are 
needed to follow the interaction between the motives of individuals and the 
characteristics of the groups in which they move (Van Stekelenburg, 
Klandermans, and van Dijk 2011). One comprehensive framework for 
moving from macro-level to micro-level characteristics claims that social 
modernization influences state structure; state structure influences mobilizing 
agencies; and mobilizing agencies influence political activism as moderated 
by resources and motivation (Norris 2002, 20). Thus, it is necessary to 
include macro-level indicators of human development, aggregate levels of 
political rights, civil liberties, and state institutions, and the measures of the 
mobilizing organizations, individual resources, and motivation to model 
political activism (Kaase 1990, 42; Norris 2002, 31).  
Taking this into account, I propose a model of participation in collective 
action. I contend that the individual’s reaction to a perceived degradation in 
the performance of the state is conditioned by the combination of pre-
existing political, social, and attitudinal characteristics of the individual, 
motive sources and mobilizing structures through which participation could 
take place, and macro-level contextual factors of civic culture and 
socioeconomic conditions. Figure 1 is a visual representation of this model. 
Through the use of this model, it will be possible to see which of the three 
interpretations of collective action is the most plausible. The following three 
sections will describe the theoretical foundation for each part of the model. 
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A. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
There are three categories of individual characteristics. The first, 
“Socioeconomic Characteristics”, focuses on signs that an individual has the 
time and resources to participate in collective action. The second, “Political 
Characteristics,” deals with an individual’s interest in politics and political 
convictions. Finally, “Attitudinal Characteristics” examines an individual’s 
expectations and judgment of state performance.  The relation between the 
components and groups of components are represented in Figure 2. 
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1. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The “Socioeconomic Characteristics” category is composed of five 
elements: gender, education, religiosity, social class (subjective and objective), 
and age. The main points are the following: 
• Due to gendered cultural expectations, men should be more likely to 
participate than women. 
• Educational attainment should correlate with greater participation 
because higher education raises individual awareness of degradation 
and is linked with access to greater resources. 
• Religion is a source of norms ordering and justifying power relations in 
society. Acceptance of religious ideology results in higher tolerance of 
the status quo, especially among individuals in high social positions. 
Therefore, religious belief and participation in religious activities should 
correlate with less participation. 
• Subjective identification with the elite and objective elite status 
(income) should correlate with greater participation, since the elite has 
more time and resources to devote to collective action. However, this 
relationship may be weak because the unemployed, objectively lower 
classes should also correlate with greater participation, for the same 
reasons. 
• Age should weakly correlate with less participation because, despite the 
mainstreaming of collective action, youth tend to have the greatest time 
available to spend joining in collective action. 
In summary, participants in collective action are likely to be drawn from 
portions of the population that are disproportionately male, younger, more 
educated, less religious, and elite. 
 
a. Gender 
 
The first, most salient element of individual characteristics is gender 
(Dalton 2002, 68). When men join collective action, their behavior is 
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generally within masculine cultural boundaries (Women and Social Protest 1990, 
4). This is not the case for women. Protest politics has long been associated 
with men, and participation by women has generally been perceived as a 
violation of gendered legal codes, religious ideologies, and social doctrines 
(ibid.).  
With the ongoing social diffusion of collective action as an acceptable 
political resource, the gender gap has been closing in recent years (Van Aelst 
and Walgrave 2001). This may be the result of the success of the feminist 
movement, which oriented the political potential of young women towards 
the use of collective action (Marsh and Kaase 1979b, 134). Economic 
development is also associated with the closing gender gap, suggesting 
economic growth may further reduce the disparity (Inglehart and Norris 
2000).  
Nevertheless, a significant gender gap remains and there is some doubt 
over whether and how this disparity may continue to close (Norris 2002, 
200–202). For example, women today are less likely to participate in 
collective action specifically against sexism than in the past (Ellemers and 
Barreto 2009). This is because “modern” sexist views are less likely to be 
perceived as a form of discrimination, eliciting less anger and, as a result, less 
support for collective action, the intention to protest, and collective action 
behavior (ibid.). Gender is expected to be a consistently influential predictor 
of participation in collective action. 
 
b. Educational Attainment 
 
Another strong predictor of participation in collective action is 
educational attainment (Campbell 2013). Differences in education exacerbate 
inequality of unconventional political activism to a greater extent than 
institutionalized forms of participation, such as voting (Marien, Hooghe, and 
Quintelier 2010). Voting has a relatively low threshold of required knowledge 
and an extremely low time commitment. Attending a protest requires both 
Participation in 
collective action by 
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more effort and time, restricting the potential population of protesters to 
those with enough available resources. It is possible that the common 
explanatory basis of class and education would result in interaction effects 
(although this will be beyond the scope of this analysis). 
The explanatory power of educational attainment comes from the 
relative nature of social status, since only high-status citizens are generally 
able to spend the time and effort to participate. In addition, increased 
education leads to more participation in civic associations, which form the 
mobilizing structures of collective action (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). 
Therefore, greater educational attainment is predicted to correlate strongly 
and positively with participation. 
 
c. Religiousness 
 
Religious belief is the third predictor of participation. Religion is an 
intermediary between authority and individual citizens, a means of 
impressing society’s structures of power upon the mental structures of 
individuals (Bourdarias 2009). It works as a sort of language, one that is both 
structured by and structuring of society (Bourdieu 1971). The content of this 
language contains the symbols, beliefs and collective practices of the entire 
social body (André and Hilgers 2009). When exposed to this religious 
language, individual dispositions are conditioned to internalize this system 
and transform a society’s ethos, or implicit aspirations, into a personally 
meaningful ethic, or systematized ensemble of explicit norms (Bourdieu 
1971). 
The norms diffused by religious ideology are intended to order the 
temporal world and relations between individuals (Bourdarias 2009). Religion 
is subordinate to the power relations, both real and imaginary, within society 
(Bernault and Tonda 2000). As such, religion is predisposed to assume a 
political ideological function, work to erase relativism, and legitimize 
authority in the minds of believers (Bourdieu 1971). 
Religion impresses 
social structures of 
power on individual 
predispositions. 
Differences in 
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participation. 
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The political impact of religion does not, however, have a uniform 
influence on every member of society. The social position of the audience is 
linked to the production of specific kinds of religious messages (André and 
Hilgers 2009). Given that religion is oriented towards the confirmation and 
legitimation of propositions linked to the existential and social concerns of 
its audience, the social function of religion differs according to the audience’s 
position in the class relation structure and the division of religious labor 
(Bourdieu 1971). 
When religious institutions are confronted with the liberalization of the 
social and political sphere, they tend to splinter (André and Hilgers 2009). 
The better-off are more apt to follow religious messages that confirm the 
moral righteousness of the status quo, while poorer individuals are likely to 
support a more activist ideology. Nevertheless, religion acts as a brake on 
participation on the whole, since the poor are unlikely to have the time or 
resources to devote to collective action, as described below. 
Therefore, since religious ideology often places social perturbations and 
conflict in a negative light, it is reasonable to predict that religious individuals 
would avoid taking part in the chaos of collective action (Bourdarias 2009). 
The results of the seminal five-nation survey by Alan Marsh and Max Kaase 
support this view, finding a negative correlation between strong religious 
feelings, of any form, and participation in collective action (1979b, 118). 
On the other hand, some thinkers argue that, on the contrary, the 
religious should be more likely than most to participate in collective action, 
either because they are habitual joiners, have internalized religious beliefs 
encouraging participation, or because religious social groups encourage 
attendance at such events (Campbell 2013). This, too, has received some 
empirical support. A recent study by David E. Campbell suggests frequent 
religious attendance is positively correlated with an individual’s civic and 
political participation. Though the former explanation appears to be more 
convincing from a theoretical perspective, but this analysis provides an 
excellent opportunity to test the latter. 
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d. Class 
 
The fourth element, class, intuitively appears to be a good predictor of 
participation. This is because recourse to the use of voice comes far more 
readily to the elite than other members of society, leading to their 
overrepresentation in the political sphere and a positive-feedback loop 
(Hirschman 1970, 53). High-status groups use disproportionate access to the 
political sphere in order to pursue reforms that increasingly widen the gap in 
political participation between social classes (ibid.). As Elmer E. 
Schnattschneider remarked, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the 
heavenly choir sings with a strong upper-class accent” (quoted in Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996, 177). 
Income is an objective measure of class. As described above, voice 
comes more readily at the upper end of the income range. This results in an 
increasingly defined separation of the richest and the rest of society 
(Hirschman 1970, 53). While the traditional class conflict model argues that 
the poorest should be the most supportive of social change, they must have 
the time and resources available to participate (Inglehart 1990, 93). 
Therefore, higher income should correlate with greater participation, though 
it may be curvilinear if the poorest, having the greatest reason to 
participation, are able to do so. 
Subjective class should also be a strong predictor, since it includes 
individuals who identify with the elite without objectively being so. 
Individuals who anticipate joining the elite, but are not yet elite, often behave 
like objectively elite individuals. For example, the aspirational elite are equally 
likely as the objectively elite to support oppressive behavior when presented 
with negative norms about out-groups (Postmes and Smith 2009). The effect 
of subjective belonging on willingness to oppress has been noted in other 
domains, as well, such as religious affiliation (Bourdarias 2009). 
Empirical research has drawn conflicting conclusions about the power of 
subjective class to predict participation in collective action. Marsh and Kaase 
claim that class, both objective and subjective, has no consistent relationship 
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to collective action (Marsh and Kaase 1979b, 127). A more recent study 
found that, though perhaps less influential than in the past, objective class 
continues to be source of differentiation of political behavior (Caínzos and 
Voces 2010). That study did not consider the role of subjective class, which 
this analysis will also attempt to clarify. 
 
e. Age 
 
Finally, age has been long been believed to condition participation in 
collective action (Norris 2002, 200–202). Age is traditionally understood to 
stand in a negative relationship with protest potential, with the youngest 
respondents holding the highest protest potential (Marsh and Kaase 1979b, 
104). 
Over recent years, the participation profile of collective action has 
evolved and the overrepresentation of youth at protests has diminished. This 
may be due to the social diffusion of protest as a legitimate tool of dissent 
(Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The mainstreaming of protest is due to the 
combination of civic associations’ increasingly frequent use of collective 
action and the fact that the middle-aged are generally the most strongly 
involved age group in civic associations (Norris 2002, 200-202). In addition, 
value change may have contributed positively to this evolution. However, 
there should still be an overrepresentation of youth at collective action 
because they are most likely to have the time to participate. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to predict that age has a weakly negative correlation with protest 
participation. 
 
2. POLITICAL CHARCTERISTICS 
 
In addition to the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, political 
characteristics are key components of individual attitudes towards collective 
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action. In this analysis, this category is broken up into the individual’s interest 
in politics and his or her political ideology. Individuals with a greater interest 
in politics, supportive of democracy, and aligned with issues central to the 
political left should correlate positively with participation. 
 
a. Political Interest 
 
Individuals with political interest are strongly likely to participate in 
politics (Campbell 2013).  There is a two-way relationship between political 
interest and political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 8). The more 
one knows about politics, the more one is interested. However, interest in 
politics is not sufficient to have political knowledge. In addition to 
motivation to learn, political knowledge is the product of the ability and 
opportunity to learn, as moderated by socioeconomic and systemic factors 
(Campbell 2013). 
This relationship functions within the context of social networks, with 
the content of political knowledge and the strength of political interest 
working within an individuals larger social environment (ibid.). Therefore, 
membership in a political party should be indicative of a relatively high level 
of interest in traditional politics. 
Assuming participants support the goals of collective action, the 
“inherent tension between promoting a society with enthusiastically 
participative citizens and promoting one imbued with tolerance and respect 
for differences of opinion” makes it appear likely that individuals who are 
interested and involved in traditional politics, and thus knowledgeable and 
opinionated, participate in collective action (Mutz 2006, 3). 
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b. Political Ideology 
 
The second aspect of the individual’s political character is political 
ideology, both in terms of support for the democratic system and along the 
left-right ideological axis. Ideology works to rationalize emotional responses 
to relative deprivation (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2009). 
Justifications that bypass the cost/benefit mindset are often powerful enough 
to overcome the problem posed by collective action, making it a strong 
motive source (ibid.). 
Since political parties are the main source of ideology, there is often an 
associational component to ideology, further increasing the likelihood of 
participation (Van Stekelenburg 2012). Parties on the left side of the 
ideological spectrum have long been linked with collective action due to their 
traditional alliance with labor organizations and with progressive political 
orientations (Horowitz 1972, 355). Therefore, support for issues that have 
long been associated with the left, such as welfare and income equality, 
should positively correlate with participation. 
Individuals may also identify with anti-democratic political parties. If an 
individual does not support democracy as a political system, they would be 
more likely to use exit, rejecting the legitimacy of those in power, rather than 
use voice to achieve reform within the current system. 
 
3. ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Dissatisfaction, both political and social, and values compose the third 
and final component: attitudinal characteristics. Perhaps intuitively, 
discontented individuals desirous of reform should be more likely to 
participate in collective action. In addition, individuals who prize self-
expression, rational, and postmaterialist values should be more likely to 
exercise voice. 
 
Political ideology 
justifies emotional 
responses to 
relative deprivation. 
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a. Discontent 
 
The causal chain of dissatisfaction is theorized to work as follows: the 
greater the relative deprivation perceived, the greater the frustration; the 
greater the frustration, the greater the aggression (Gurr 1970, 9). Anger, the 
product of emotional coping mechanisms following the observation of unfair 
treatment, is hypothesized to energize the individual to act (Stürmer and 
Simon 2009). In this sense, collective action is the politicized product of 
discontent (Gurr 1970, 320). Accordingly, dissatisfaction is predicted to 
correlate positively with participation. 
While the capacity for self-expression through protest is inherent in the 
individual, the willingness to use it depends upon the degree to which social 
expectations are violated (Gurr 1970, 317). Their violation is an essentially 
subjective judgment on the part of the individual (Hirschman 1970, 34). 
Modern democratic governments are burdened with high public expectations 
for the provision of services. These governments sometimes fail to deliver, 
leading to the public’s inevitable disappointment and resulting in a decline of 
public confidence in government (Thomassen 1990, 104).  
This route to protest is fragile, however, since the desire to express 
discontent may result in the selection of less costly means than collective 
action (Stürmer and Simon 2009). It appears that discontent affects the 
individual’s desire to participate only to the extent that it represents an 
opportunity to experience a cathartic reduction of aggression (ibid.).  When 
an alternative means of relief is provided, there is no connection between 
discontent and protest potential (ibid.). Furthermore, elite-challenging 
behavior is most popular among individuals with an optimistic view of their 
own future (Thomassen 1990, 133). 
Empirical analyses have shown that there is no evidence of a relation 
between protest potential and support for either the governing authorities or 
the political regime as a whole (ibid., 132-133). The degree of support for the 
political regime is similarly not linked to the actual rate of participation in 
demonstrations (Koopmans 1996). In addition, dissatisfaction is not 
Anger is a fragile 
route to collective 
action, since less 
costly means of 
catharsis may be 
preferred. 
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correlated with traditional political participation, such as voting, engaging in 
campaigns, or being involved in local politics (Dalton 2002, 51–54). 
Therefore, given the costliness of participating in collective action, the 
relationship between discontent and collective action may be weak. 
 
b. Values 
 
The studies cited in the section above generally deal only with protest 
potential and ignore the question of realizing this potential. When exit is not 
an option, as is often the case in the political sphere, discontented individuals 
will be maximally motivated to use voice to bring their dissatisfaction to the 
attention of those in power (Hirschman 1970, 70). However, without the 
accompanying desire to express one’s self, dissatisfaction remains latent. In 
addition, holding secular and rational values may help individuals causally 
link discontent with worldly social structures, favoring participation in 
collective action. 
These values do not come into being in a vacuum. Often secure in 
satisfying their immediate needs, postmaterialist individuals tend to have 
been economically secure during their youth, when values are developed and 
solidified (Inglehart 1990, 98). Today, postmaterialists are an emerging 
minority whose priorities are often left unaddressed by the traditional 
political establishment (ibid., 92). Since they value material things less than 
materialists, they may view the economic disruptions caused by collective 
action less negatively (ibid.). Therefore, one would expect that individuals 
holding values emphasizing self-expression and rationality would be 
particularly apt to participate in collective action (Welzel and Inglehart 2008).  
Postmaterialists use collective action as a strategic resource for civic 
expression (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). Economic development 
increases people’s resources and results in a greater desire for self-expression 
and freedom of choice (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). This desire leads to 
citizen empowerment, and, since the institutions most permissive of citizen 
Without the desire 
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involvement are democratic ones, people tend to seek democracy (ibid.). The 
rise of self-expression values is a process that moves a society from electoral 
democracy, which is simply based on suffrage, to “effective” democracy, 
where citizens are able to effectively apply pressure upon the political elite.  
While a great deal of empirical research supports the predictive power of 
postmaterialism values, at least one analysis has found no association 
between postmaterialism and participation in unconventional forms of 
political participation (Koopmans 1996). While postmaterialist values are 
expected to correlate positively with participation, it is of interest to see 
whether this relationship is supported in light of Koopman’s conclusions. 
 
4. COMBINATIONS 
 
The three types of individual characteristics share several common 
linkages, since it is impossible to draw hard divisions between them. Most 
notably, religious ideology can influence both social characteristics and 
attitudes. Expectations of political responsibility may also represent both 
political and attitudinal characteristics. Similar distinctions could be made for 
many of the other factors. 
 
B. MOTIVE AND MOBILIZATION 
 
Simply being willing to participate in collective action does not cause an 
individual to do so. Mobilization is “the process by which a group acquires 
collective control of the resources needed for action” (C. Tilly 1978, 7). It 
describes the creation and activation of commitment, which requires an 
effort of some kind (Gamson 1975, 15). Therefore, a motive is required to 
justify this effort and start the process of turning protest potential into 
participation. Then a mobilizing structure is required to extend this 
willingness into sustained participation. This process is described in Figure 3. 
A motive is 
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the effort of 
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The Loud and the Unhappy 
 
 30 
 
 
F
ig
ur
e 
3 
– 
Sc
he
m
at
ic
 o
f t
he
 m
ot
iv
e 
vo
ca
liz
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s. 
T
he
 m
ot
iv
e 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 c
os
t/
be
ne
fit
, i
de
nt
ity
 a
nd
 a
ng
er
 in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
tr
an
si
tio
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
to
 m
ob
ili
za
tio
n 
ph
as
e.
 I
de
nt
ity
 a
nd
 a
ng
er
 m
ay
 fu
nc
tio
n 
on
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
or
 in
 c
on
ce
rt
 w
ith
 o
ne
 
an
ot
he
r. 
T
he
 s
oc
ie
ta
l m
ob
ili
zi
ng
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
of
 s
oc
ia
l n
et
w
or
ks
 a
nd
 fo
rm
al
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
tr
an
si
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
iti
al
 
m
ob
ili
za
tio
n 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t. 
T
he
re
 is
 o
ft
en
 o
ve
rla
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
so
ci
al
 n
et
w
or
ks
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
, b
ut
 e
ac
h 
ca
n 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
ly
 s
us
ta
in
 m
ob
ili
za
tio
n 
on
 th
ei
r o
w
n.
 
The Loud and the Unhappy 
 
 31 
When a deterioration of performance is observed, individuals internally 
vocalize motives to provide new reasons to participate in collective action 
(Mills 1940). The vocalization of motive takes place in three stages. The 
individual first must reach the understanding that his or her personal 
problem is the result of a public problem (Klandermans 1997, 5–7). Next, 
the individual must choose to act upon such an understanding, and finally, he 
or she will sustain or abandon this newfound commitment (ibid.). New 
motives can be created by the instrumentalization of cost-benefit 
calculations, the politicization of social identification, and/or the perception 
and emotion of group-based injustice (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). These 
motive sources are often used simultaneously, but each may suffice on their 
own. Once a justification for mobilization is found, it becomes a stable 
motive, unquestioningly accepted by the individual. The individual then looks 
to participate through a mobilizing structure, such as those provided by civic 
associations. The success or failure of this process is manifested by the 
participation or non-participation of the individual (Klandermans 1984). 
 
1. MOTIVE SOURCES 
 
Motives are strategies that provide common grounds for collective action 
(Mills 1940). These can appear as a pair of alternatives, such as love or 
money, pleasure or pain. C. Wright Mills, writing on motive in 1940, 
described it as “one which is to the actor and to the other members of a 
situation an unquestioned answer to questions concerning social…conduct.” 
For Mills, motive the key influence on decision-making, being “that in man 
which leads him to do good or evil” (ibid.). 
There are three sources of motive. Cost/benefit analysis is the basis of 
rational participation. In this case, individuals will choose to participate in 
collective if he or she perceives the potential benefit of joining to be greater 
than the cost. Identity is a normative appeal to the individual, bypassing the 
question of cost. Instead, participation is put forward in terms of 
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identification and group interest. Finally, anger is a motive source that can 
work either solely on the basis of principle, meaning the violation of 
normative expectations, or in tandem with a threat also appealing to the 
identity motive source. 
 
a. COST/BENEFIT 
 
The first motive source is the rational use of cost/benefit calculations, in 
which the decision to participate in collective action is the logical result of an 
internal process of weighing the costs and benefits of participation 
(Klandermans 1984). In this approach, the benefits of collective mobilization 
is the expectation of reward for effort (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009), while 
the costs are the barriers to accessing collective action events, as well as the 
potentially negative consequences of participation for the individual (Marien, 
Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010). Thus, while the consideration of the costs and 
benefits has expectations rooted in the imagination, it has consequences in 
real-world mobilization (Klandermans 1984). 
This motive source is limited, however, by the fact that participation is, as 
a rule, objectively unfavorable at the individual level. This means the costs of 
mobilization are almost always higher than the benefits (Klandermans 1997, 
6). If mobilized, the individual must pay costs and take on risk without 
knowing whether his or her effort will make the attainment of the collective 
goal any more likely or whether he or she will enjoy the benefits of any 
change stemming from the event (ibid.). Consequently, participation in 
collective action is, an example of the public good “free rider” and Prisoner’s 
Dilemma collective action problems (Lichbach 1998). 
Market approaches to solving the problem of mobilizing according to 
cost/benefit calculations with social order and contract solutions result in the 
so-called “Five Percent Rule.” This rule of thumb states that less than 5% of 
the supporters of a cause become actively involved in the cause. The fact that 
Instrumental 
motives are limited 
by the logic of 
collective action 
problems. 
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even 5% of individuals are willing to choose the less-optimal solution is 
indicative of the insufficiency of the rational motive source. 
 
b. IDENTITY 
 
A second source of motive is identity-based. Over the past few decades, 
the demands of protestors have become increasingly focused on values (Van 
Stekelenburg 2012). This suggests that the politicization of social identity and 
values is a rich source of motive today (McGarty et al. 2009). When the 
individual believes in the existence of a set of shared socio-structural 
characteristics, he or she is led to identify with a particular group, see the 
boundaries between groups as impermeable and, therefore, become more 
likely to participate in an identity-based action on behalf of group interests 
(Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). Individual attitudes and cultural themes 
influence the relationship between information and interpersonal 
interactions, resulting in the politicization of this identity (Klandermans 1997, 
21). 
The social identity source does not equate simple membership in a social 
category with membership in a social identity, or psychological group. While 
the goals of collective action are generally on the behalf of social categories, 
the categories themselves do not motivate collective action (McGarty et al. 
2009). Unlike social categories, psychological identities are context-
dependent and variable, not just the raw product of the social and economic 
rapports of force (ibid.). Individuals must subjectively choose to identify with 
a psychological group, generally by believing he or she shares the opinions of 
the group (ibid.). 
The most successful of these psychological groups present themselves as 
being aligned with dominant, positively valued social categories (ibid.). Once 
such an identity establishes itself, it begins to expand, placing pressure on 
smaller, less powerful identities, often leading to internal divisions arising 
from attempts to assure its survival (Hilgers 2009, 272). These divisions 
Individuals choose 
to take on an 
identity by 
believing he or she 
shares the group’s 
values and opinions. 
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create new opinion-based groups that individuals can use to gain a sense of 
agency and participate in collection action (Klandermans 1997, 63). 
 
c. ANGER 
 
The third and final motive source is group-based anger about a perceived 
injustice (Stürmer and Simon 2009). This source uses the influence of 
individual attitudes and cultural values to mediate the relation between 
information and social interaction (Klandermans 1997, 21). Group anger 
requires a negative contrast with other groups to motivate the desire to 
improve (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). This places the decision to mobilize 
in the context of relative deprivation, where the individual identifies with a 
dominated group (Walker and Smith 2002). The emotional response to such 
a situation gives the individual a feeling of agency and increases his or her 
willingness to participate in collective action (Klandermans 1997, 63). 
Though anger is closely aligned with the identity, the two sources are not 
identical. Anger is often a subset of identity, but the identity motive source 
can effectively mobilize individuals without a perception of relative 
deprivation and anger can be effective across inter-group boundaries. 
 
d. COMBINATIONS 
 
These three sources coexist easily since different motive sources are used 
for different actions and issues. Instrumental considerations appeal more to 
power-oriented collective action, while value-oriented protests draw more 
from the identity and anger motives (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and 
Van Dijk 2009). The growing frequency of value-based demands, combined 
with the ongoing shift towards post materialist values occurring worldwide, 
suggest that the identity and anger motive sources will continue to increase in 
their efficacy (Van Stekelenburg 2012).  
Motive sources 
vary in 
effectiveness 
according to the 
objective of the 
collective action.  
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The preference of some motive sources over others can also depend on 
the individual’s decision-making framework. Individuals who do not feel 
strongly about their social identity can be characterized as “intuitive 
economists” looking to maximize subjective utility as moderated by beliefs of 
efficacy (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). In contrast, strong identification 
might lead to a greater predisposition towards thinking as an “intuitive 
politician” attempting to maintain positive identities or as “theologians” 
defending sacred norms (ibid.). 
It is possible to use these three motive sources to predict participatory 
decision-making. For example, the politicization of social identity as 
conditioned by the combination of relative deprivation and frustration may 
have a strong influence on individual mobilization (Klandermans 1984). Such 
a model would account for variance in motivation among actual participants 
in collective action (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk 2011). 
This analysis will provide a basis for evaluating the efficacy of these three 
motive sources in mobilizing individuals to participate in collective action.  
 
2. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
 
In addition to having the motivation to participate in collective action, a 
mobilizing structure is needed for participation. The two mobilizing 
structures in society are traditional mobilizing organizations and the 
individual’s own social network. These may be related and lead to even more 
effective facilitation of mobilization. 
 
a. ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Once an individual who is predisposed to participate in collective action 
successfully vocalizes a motive for participating, he or she usually looks to 
join a collective action led by a formal organization to which he or she has 
sentiments of loyalty (Gamson 1975, 14–15). These organizations aim to 
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achieve influence over policy, a public show of forceful membership, and an 
increase in benefits for their members (ibid., 14). The question of material 
reward is often a powerful issue for these groups, as demonstrated by the 
fact that the frequency of protest events have historically peaked during 
economically challenging times, such as the decades of the 1880s and the 
1930s (ibid., 21). 
Very few participants come alone to a demonstration (Van Aelst and 
Walgrave 2001). Rather, the “motors” of collective action are associations 
(ibid.). These might be religious organizations, environmental organizations, 
or even self-help groups. In empirical analyses, individuals with higher 
participation in civic associations are more likely to protest (ibid.). 
While collective action often takes place under the supervision of 
ongoing organizations, this is not always the case. The rise of “New Social 
Movements,” focusing on the postmaterialist themes of ecology, LGBT and 
women’s rights, the Third World, and anti-nuclear issues, among others, 
signal an addition to conventional forms of mobilization (Koopmans 1996). 
These movements often offer an individualized form of collective action 
but do not easily accept the participation of traditional organizations (Van 
Stekelenburg 2012). For example, traditional institutional organizations were 
seen as “greedy” for demanding large investments of time and effort during 
the Occupy Wall Street protests (ibid.). Protestors favored “light” groups, 
which were more informal, being easy to join and easy to leave (ibid.). What 
remained true, however, was the continued need to for some form of 
organizational framework to marshal group demands and co-ordinate plans 
of action. 
 
b. SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
The second aspect of mobilizing structures, social networks, drive the 
“New Social Movements.” While social scientists increasingly recognize the 
importance of social networks in predicting participation in collective action, 
Formal 
organizations are 
the “motors” of 
collective action. 
The Loud and the Unhappy 
 
 37 
they are difficult to measure (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). This is because 
the influence of social networks is determined by their content, not just their 
structure (ibid.). Individuals who reinforce salient identities, such as friends in 
mobilizing organizations, are crucial mediators of participation (Campbell 
2013). Participation is “contagious,” meaning the decision to participate can 
influence up to four other members of an individual’s social network. 
Social network-based explanations of participation in collective action 
focus on the recruitment of the individual, the linkage of that person’s 
identity with the movement, and the confirmation of that movement by 
identity-sustaining individuals in the absence of strong opposition by other 
individuals (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). These high requirements explain 
the “Five Percent Rule” of support and participation, in contrast with 
explanations focusing on the logical dilemma of participation (Lichbach 
1998). 
 
3. COMBINATIONS 
 
These two components are often combined since social ties are 
particularly powerful mediators of recruitment when friends are embedded in 
a broader mobilizing organization (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). In addition, 
individuals who feel that they can influence the direction of a larger 
organization through their social ties are more likely to participate in 
collective action (Hirschman 1970, 40).  Organizations, in turn, use social 
networks to support their communication efforts and their access to similar 
organizations and state institutions (McCarthy and Zald 1977). This analysis 
will consider both the type of civic organization and the strength of 
involvement, as this is indicative is both the content and number of 
embedded social ties. 
 
The influence of 
social ties is 
increased when 
embedded in 
organizations. 
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C. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
 
The third and final portion of the model is the contextual factors of the 
situation in which the collective action is taking place. The practices, 
representations, and forms of individuation are determined by the 
“imaginative spaces” of society (Hilgers 2009, 208). There are three such 
spaces in society: the government, the market, and civil society (Zompetti 
2006). Collective action can only take place when the imaginative space 
allows for the critique of authority (Hilgers 2009, 208). When this space 
exists, citizens can gain the skills of civic activism and participate in the 
construction of a shared set of political orientations, or civic culture 
(Zompetti 2006). 
Societal context is linked to individual participation because individuals 
within a nation are likely to hold similar values and, since holding different 
values would presumably lead different individuals to participate in collective 
action, it is reasonable to hypothesize that national-level measures would be 
significant predictors of participation (Inglehart and Baker 2000). As 
described in Figure 3, the two central contextual factors are the degree to 
which the political orientations encouraged by a country’s civic culture and a 
country’s socioeconomic conditions. Participative institutions are closely 
linked with socioeconomic development, since economic development is 
associated with a growing desire to participate in political action (Welzel and 
Inglehart 2008).  
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1. CIVIC CULTURE 
 
As conceived by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, civic culture is “a 
pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of 
consensus and diversity, a culture that permit[s] change, but moderate[s] it” 
(1989, 8). The character of a society’s civic culture is mediated by 
interpersonal relationships, and trust and confidence in others (Almond and 
Verba 1989, 493). A particularly important influence on a society’s civic 
culture is religion. Religious ideology provides the framework for the 
construction of a particular interpretation of social relations, which then 
affects political perceptions, the exercise of voice, and the power of loyalty 
(André and Hilgers 2009). 
 
a. POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
Almond and Verba explain that one subset of civic culture is political 
culture, which is made up of the set of specifically political attitudes, or 
psychological orientations, regarding the political system and the role of the 
self in the system (13). Political attitudes are composed of three levels of 
increasingly complex orientations. The first is cognitive, containing an 
individual’s knowledge of the political system’s inputs and outputs (ibid., 15). 
The second level is affective, which covers the individual’s feelings about the 
information at the cognitive level (ibid.). On a societal scale, these levels 
might be informed by national measures of religiosity or postmaterialist 
values or a history of communism. The third orientation is evolutional, 
where judgments are made combining values, information, and feelings 
(ibid.). 
Social-function labels can efficiently characterize these evolutional 
decision-making frameworks and the priorities inherent to them. These 
include goal-oriented scientists, utilitarian economists, accountability-oriented 
pragmatic politicians, principled theologians trying to protect the sacred, or 
Social-function 
labels are useful for 
summarizing 
decision-making 
frameworks 
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prudent prosecutors enforcing social norms (Tetlock 2002). While people use 
different blends of these functions over time as individual frameworks rise 
and fall in relative salience, the political cultures of successful democracies 
usually feature a preponderance of participatory political orientations that use 
a balanced mix of instrumental and emotional information (Almond and 
Verba 1989, 489). 
In participatory political cultures, citizens have an “activist” self-
conception, meaning they focus on both the political system’s inputs and 
outputs (ibid., 19). The presence of activist citizens enhances democratic 
sustainability because they are available and willing to work to maintain the 
performance of the political system (ibid., 31, 496). Similarly, non-
participatory attitudes, which limit the individual’s willingness to commit to 
politics, are correlated with non-democratic political systems (ibid., 32). 
Activist political orientations can be measured by examining participation in 
collective actions, such as petitions, lawful demonstrations, and boycotts 
(Kaase 1990, 47).  
The extent to which participatory political orientations are present is the 
product of a combination of psychological factors, shaped by personal 
experience, sociological factors, and social structure (Becker 1963, 26–27). 
Long-term predispositions conditioned by religion in particular are highly 
predictive of political behavior, including mobilization for collective action 
(Inglehart 1990, 98). The presence of a participatory political culture is not 
sufficient, however, to explain the willingness of an individual to 
demonstrate; the means of collective action need to be perceived as effective, 
too. The relationship between the expectation of efficacy and political 
orientation goes both ways. In non-participatory political cultures, exit, rather 
than voice, might be the preferred response to deterioration in state 
performance. This would occur when the change through the current 
political and social system is perceived to be impossible, leading to the loss of 
legitimacy by authority and an increased potential for social upheaval 
(Horowitz 1972, 294).  
Individual 
expectations of 
performance, not 
objective 
accomplishments, 
determine political 
action. 
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Citizens in participatory cultures, on the other hand, may postpone the 
use of exit or regard it as an option of last resort (Hirschman 1970, 37). 
Voice is then seen as a useful option, since there is a precedent of individuals 
contributing to the reformation of the political system. It is therefore 
unsurprising that people in societies where activist political attitudes are 
relatively widespread also tend to believe that collective action has high 
efficacy (Marsh and Kaase 1979a, 92). Since they have invested in the 
construction of the political and social system as active citizens, rather than 
passive subjects, they are reticent to call the system dysfunctional. To exit 
such a society would be to admit defeat, while reform allows for the 
possibility of eventual success. 
 
b. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
The presence of competitive political systems and participative 
institutions are also thought to result in greater participation in collective 
action (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Competitive and participative 
structures have the capacity to divert what might be otherwise revolutionary 
desires into tame discontent with the governing authorities (Hirschman 1970, 
28). Citizens identify with political parties through the investment of effort 
on their behalf, diverting discontent towards elections and other 
conventional forms of participation. In addition, the fewer the political 
parties, the more lively the intra-party struggle, since the limited number of 
parties raises exit costs and leads to the preferential use of voice by 
discontented party members (ibid., 84). If these costs become too high, such 
as the case in one-party states however, authoritarian organizations can 
repress both voice and exit and take advantage of the captive state of their 
members (ibid., 97). In such situations, discontent with the party becomes 
discontent with the regime, nullifying the benefit of participative systems. 
Participation in government is more than the simple extension of 
suffrage. Effective democracy requires giving citizens the right to choose 
Competitive 
political systems 
divert discontent 
into traditional 
forms of political 
participation. 
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their governors and to participate in decisions about substantive issues 
(Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Inequalities in political participation result in 
inequalities in political life, since those in less politically active portions of the 
population feel they do not have a mechanism to have their voice heard 
(Smith 2009). Therefore, merely having a democratic political system does 
not equate with having participative political institutions. 
The extent to which a democracy is participative can be measured by 
considering measures of formal democracy and elite integrity (Welzel and 
Inglehart 2008). In this analysis, Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” 
score is used for the former and the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitive Index’s “Public Institution Score” measures the latter. While 
institutionalized competition is normally linked to greater participation in 
collective action (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 149-151), others propose 
that the effect of opening the opportunity structure to social movements may 
result in the decline of the prominence of unconventional collective action 
(Koopmans 1996). This analysis will attempt to shed further light on the 
influence of participative institutions. 
 
2. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
While cultural and political heritage leaves a clear and enduring imprint 
on civic and political culture, economic development can stimulate the 
spread of activist political orientations (Inglehart and Baker 2000). A.O. 
Hirschman’s classic work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, rests on the implicit 
assumption that collective action results from the overgrowth of expectations 
relative to government performance (Thomassen 1990, 107). This means that 
individual attitudes and expectations of state performance, not objective 
accomplishments, are determinants of political action (Barnes and Kaase 
1979, 16). 
Examining the linkage between individual attitudes and behavior can test 
this claim (Kaase 1990, 49). For example, rapid economic development in 
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semi-authoritarian African states in the first half of the 1990s coincided a 
growth of participatory attitudes in these states (Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997, 3). These activist citizens organized demonstrations against 
underperforming governments and helped lead the transition away from 
single-party and military rule by pushing for liberalizing reforms, culminating 
with competitive elections and the installation of new regimes approximately 
five years later (ibid.). 
One widely respected measure of socioeconomic development, the 
second factor, is the United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Index. The Human Development Index is a measure of quality 
of life combining life expectancy, educational attainment, and income. Fully 
60% of the variation in the development of effective democracy can be 
explained by changes in the Human Development Index, twice as much 
explanatory power than the relationship has for electoral democracies 
(Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Citizens of societies that produce surpluses may 
initially give the state greater latitude for deterioration of performance 
because such inefficiency leads only to discomfort, not disaster (Hirschman 
1970, 7-9). If deteriorated conditions persist, however, discontented citizens 
are forced to choose between exit and voice. In effective democracies, 
citizens prefer to use voice (Norris 2002, 198-199). Therefore, greater 
socioeconomic development is predicted to have a positive correlation with 
participation in collective action. 
 
3. COMBINATIONS 
 
Rising Human Development Index scores are correlated with the spread 
of effective democracy, as determined by measures of formal democracy and 
elite integrity. The development of effective democracy is correlated with the 
greater exercise of voice (ibid.). This effect also can be observed at the 
individual level, with changes economic circumstances, whatever the 
direction, resulting in higher rates of participation (Thomassen 1990, 122). 
Socioeconomic 
development is 
associated with the 
creation of 
effective 
democracy and 
greater use of 
voice.  
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IV. METHODS  
A. OPERATIONALIZATION OF PREDICTORS 
 
In order to test the model described above, it is necessary to measure 
actual participation in a collective action and correlate participation with a 
battery of predictive factors. Many of studies of collective action have limited 
themselves to the willingness of individuals to participate (Topf 1995, 58). 
The results of these studies would suggest there is a considerable difference 
between being willing to participate and actually participating (Marsh and 
Kaase 1979a, 92). Measures of protest potential may be confounded by social 
values or general political orientations, rendering it an unreliable, context-
dependent measure (Norris 2002, 194). In order to avoid this problem, the 
study of collective action requires evaluating models using data from those 
actually engaged in it, not just those positively disposed towards it. 
In addition, while Marx and Engels identified two important aspects of 
collective action, social structure and its current state of performance, the 
motivation to join in collective action is produced by individual desire (Van 
Zomeren and Iyer 2009). The way to examine this is by placing the focus on 
similar individual-level relationships within in a given society (Norris, 
Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). By identifying similar slopes without much 
concern for different regression intercepts, it may be possible to control for 
cultural factors and draw large-scale conclusions about the desire to 
participate in collective action (Barnes and Kaase 1979, 21). 
Scientific surveys allow researchers to learn about the values, beliefs, and 
behaviors of the average citizen (Dalton 2002, xiii). While some have 
expressed concerns about encountering reporting bias when asking about 
participation in collective action, these have generally been unfounded. Using 
surveys to evaluate participation in peaceful protest has not been shown to 
have a significant impact on under-reporting (Meyerhoff and Liebe 2010). In 
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addition, non-response bias has been found to be independent of political 
interest or orientation (Rüdig 2010). While some mail questionnaires have 
encountered difficulties with over-response from some populations, the 
World Values Survey, the source for all individual-level data in this analysis, 
avoids such problems as it is conducted through face-to-face interviews. 
The predictors of the model described above are operationalized through 
the use of questions in 5th (2005-2008) and 6th (2009-2013) waves of the 
World Values Survey. The countries and years surveyed are listed on Table 1. 
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Participation in collective action, the dependent variable in the model, is 
measured as a binary response to the question, “Have you participated in a 
peaceful/lawful demonstration in the past 5 years?” The response, “yes,” is 
counted as a positive outcome and “no” or “don’t know” are considered 
negative outcomes. 
The independent variables are approached in the following ways and 
original survey questions can be found in Appendix A. Religiousness is 
measured through a question of practice, membership in a church (or other 
religious organization), and a question of belief, the importance of God in 
one’s life. Class is measured through subjective placement in social class and 
by income and employment status. Educational attainment is measured on 
four levels: none, primary, secondary, and tertiary. Sex and age are measured 
through direct questions. Interest in traditional politics is measured directly 
and in terms of membership in a political party. Political ideology is 
measured through placement on a left/right spectrum and support of 
democracy as a political system. 
General discontent is measured through a question about the individual’s 
level of happiness in life and political discontent is measured in terms of 
confidence in the national government. Values are measured through the 
World Values Survey’s composite measures of postmaterialism: self-
expression-survival values and traditional-rational values. 
Participation in civic organizations is measured through a composite 
measure of membership. These organizations include sport clubs, art, music, 
and educational organizations, labor organizations, environmental 
organizations, professional organizations, and humanitarian organizations. 
The question allows for the distinction between nonmembers, inactive 
members, and active members. The composite “civic activism score” 
considers an individual’s level of involvement in each type of civic 
organization, with non-membership counting for 0 points, inactive 
membership counting for 1 point, and active membership counting for 2 
points. This composite measure does not include membership in a political 
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party or a religious organization in order to avoid double-counting in the 
analysis. 
Finally, the contextual factors of civic culture and socioeconomic 
conditions are considered. The political systems and institutions component 
of civic culture is measured through the Freedom House Freedom in the 
World Index and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive Index’s 
Public Institutions score. Political culture is evaluated in terms of national 
mean postmaterialism score, the presence or absence of a legacy of 
communist rule, and cultural zone. This measure is modeled on the World 
Value Survey’s “Cultural Map” and contains nine world cultures: Africa, 
Catholic Europe, Confucian, English-speaking, Islamic, Orthodox, 
Protestant Europe, South Asia, and South America (Inglehart and Welzel 
2010, 554). Socioeconomic conditions are measured through the Human 
Development Index and GDP growth at time-of-survey. 
 
B. MODEL CREATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Of the countries surveyed in the 5th and 6th waves of the World Value 
Survey, only countries that had responses for all the variables included in this 
analysis were considered. When a country fulfilled this requirement in both 
waves, the oldest observations were discarded. The pattern of missing 
country-level data is believed to be random and estimated through multiple 
imputation, a technique to replace missing data with plausible values in order 
to allow for inference about population parameters.11While there is no 
consensus way to use hot deck imputation and obtain inferences about the 
completed data set, it is used by highly respected organizations, such as the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the National Center for Education Statistics to 
perform population-level analyses. The main advantages of hot deck 
imputation lie in its independence from model fitting, possible gains in 
                                                
1 All information pertaining to imputation in this section relies on Andridge and Little 
2010. 
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efficiency, and a reduction in non-response bias. This technique was 
performed in the statistical analysis program STATA, repeated five times, 
and its results averaged to reduce the variability introduced by data non-
response. Multiple imputation was not used to estimate missing individual-
level data because the pattern of missingness appeared to be a mix of random 
and non-random patterns. “Don’t Know” responses were assumed to be 
randomly missing and treated as non-responses.  
Following the imputation of country-level data, a series of logistic 
regressions were performed with the dependent variable, “Attended a 
Peaceful Demonstration” (No/Yes) and clustered by country. First, a “main 
model” was analyzed. The variables included in this model were suggested by 
the literature to be strong, consistent predictors of participation. These are: 
sex, political interest, self-placement on the left/right ideological scale, 
support of democracy, and the scores on the survival-self-expression and 
traditional-rational value scales.  
Three other sets of variables were created and regressed with the main 
model in different combinations. The first set of variables contains other 
measures of individual characteristics. These included education, subjective 
class, income, age, employment status, membership in a political party, 
membership in a church (or other religious organization), and the importance 
of God in one’s life.  
The second set of variables contains measures of happiness, confidence 
in the national government, and civic activism. Finally, the third variable set 
contains national-level measures. These are GDP growth at the time of 
survey, presence or absence of communist heritage, and the cultural zone, 
national mean postmaterialism, the Freedom House, World Economic 
Forum, and Human Development Index scores. 
As described in Table 2, these three variable sets were regressed in seven 
different combinations: the main model with each of the individual variable 
sets, the main model with the three possible combinations of two variable 
sets, and the main model with all three variable sets. When large variation in 
significance was observed, select variables were re-analyzed omitting 
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regressors in a process of elimination in the attempt to isolate the variable 
combination responsible for the variation. The results of this analysis are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
TABLE 2 - Combinations of Regressions 
  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 
Main Model X X X X X X X X 
Variable Set 1 – Individual Characteristics   X     X X   X 
Variable Set 2 – Motive and Mobilization     X   X   X X 
Variable Set 3 – Contextual Factors       X   X X X 
 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
The condensed results of the logistic regression are grouped by variable 
set and shown in Table 3. I will first discuss the results of the main model 
before moving on to discuss each of the three variable sets in terms of 
direction of correlation and significance across different combinations of 
regressors. A full tabulation of results from all eight regression is located in 
Appendix B. Significance is set at the 95% confidence and strong significance 
is set at the 99% confidence level
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Table 3 – Condensed Regression Results – Values reported are odds ratios. R1 = Main Model (MM), R2 = MM + Variable Set (VS) 1, R3 
= MM + VS2, R4 = MM + VS3, R5 = MM + VS1 + VS2, R6 = MM + VS1 + VS3, R7 = MM + VS2 + VS3, R8 = MM + VS1 + VS2 + 
VS3.  * – p-value ≤ 0.05, ** - p-value ≤ 0.01, *** - p-value ≤ 0.001. 
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The variables in for the main model are consistently, strongly significant 
across models. Males are approximately much more likely to participate than 
females. Holding a strong interest in politics is also a strong predictor of 
participation, with less interest correlating with less participation. When 
asked to place themselves on a left/right ideological scale, individuals who 
place themselves in the center and right portions of the scale are the least 
likely to participate. Holding a very positive opinion of democracy as political 
system is also strongly correlated with participation. So far as values are 
concerned, individuals prizing rational and self-expression values are most 
likely to participate. The only variable in the main model that appears to have 
a strong interaction effect is the traditional-rational scale, which becomes 
insignificant when combined with happiness (Appendix C). The results of 
the main model follow the predictions found in the literature. 
 The first variable set contains measures of individual characteristics. Age 
is highly significant in the eighth regression, but its effect is negligible. Social 
class, both subjectively and objectively measured, is consistently insignificant. 
Employment status is also generally insignificant, with the exception of 
housewives, who are strongly less likely than others to participate in 
collective action. Membership in a political party is predictive of 
participation, but there is a difference between active and inactive members. 
Inactive membership appears to have a strong interaction with civic activism, 
becoming insignificant only when civic activism is included in the regression 
(Appendix C). Active membership in a political party is positively correlated 
with participation, remaining significant throughout. A similar effect is 
observed between membership in a religious organization and civic activism, 
with inactive membership only becoming significant (marginally so) when 
regressed in combination with civic activism while active membership 
remains insignificant throughout (Appendix C). Finally, there is no clear 
relationship between the importance of God in one’s life and participation, as 
there is strong variation across different regressions. However, it is possible 
that individuals holding strong convictions about God’s importance, at either 
end of the spectrum, are more likely to participate than those in the middle. 
The Loud and the Unhappy 
 
 55 
The second variable set considers measures of discontent, civic 
engagement, and individual values. The unhappier an individual feels about 
life in general, the more likely he or she is to participate in demonstration. 
This strong effect is consistently observed throughout the different 
regressions. Similarly, when individuals feel less confidence in the national 
government, they are strongly more likely to participate in collective action. 
Civic activism is consistently, strongly correlated with participation. For every 
civic engagement an individual takes part in, the likelihood of their 
participation in collective action rises. Individuals with the highest civic 
activism score are over four times more likely to participate than individuals 
with the lowest score.  
The third and final variable set contains national-level measures. National 
average materialist/postmaterialist scores and the World Economic Forum’s 
Public Institutions Index are consistently insignificant and there is no clear 
relationship between participation and a country’s Freedom House score. 
Holding a communist heritage was consistently and strongly correlated with 
less participation in collective action. Positive GDP growth is strongly 
correlated with greater participation and a higher Human Development 
Index score is strongly correlated with less participation.  
Before discussing the final variable, cultural zone, it is worthwhile to 
mention these results do not account for exogenous events, such as the 2011 
Arab Spring wave of uprisings. Their limited explanatory value should be 
considered when drawing conclusions about the nature of collective action in 
these cultural zones. At the time these surveys were performed, individuals in 
Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic European, and South American countries were 
most likely to participate in collective action, individuals in African, 
Confucian, Protestant European, and English-Speaking countries were 
somewhere in the middle, and individuals in South Asian countries were the 
least likely to participate. 
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VI. LIMITATIONS 
 
There are several limitations to this analysis. The data are self-reported, 
leaving room for misinterpretation. For example, respondents might 
understand the question as asking about attendance at a wholly peaceful 
demonstration or about peacefully attending any demonstration, whether or 
not others at the demonstration were engaged in violence. 
A second consideration is the granular nature of the data. It would be 
interesting to survey the participants at different types of peaceful protests, 
so as to differentiate participants in protests according to the explicit aims of 
the action. It would also be useful to learn whether the characterization 
described above also applies to violent collective action. 
In the motive source section of this analysis, it was difficult to identify 
measures of cost/benefit calculations and identity-based mobilization. As a 
result, the only motive source examined is discontent. 
In addition, there are high levels of missing data from country to country 
(an average of 39%). It is possible some bias was introduced into the analysis 
through the listwise deletion of missing data, an approach required by logistic 
regression. A promising route for future research is to separate the random 
missing from the non-random missing data and create estimates of missing 
values for the individual-level variables to ease concerns of bias and improve 
the power of this analysis. 
A further extension of this analysis would consider mixed model effects 
to better examine and quantify multiple correlated measurements for each 
individual respondent. For example, it would be important to understand the 
interaction between religiousness and political ideology. These techniques 
were not used in this analysis due to time constraints.  
Finally, the most variation explained by this model is 19% (r2 of 
regression #8 = .19). There is clearly much more to collective action than the 
variables measured in this analysis. 
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VII. DISCUSSION 
 
The proposed model appears to be adequate for a characterization of 
participants in collective action. Civic culture and socioeconomic, political, 
and attitudinal characteristics influence an individual’s predispositions. These 
attitudes moderate the efficacy of different motive sources in inciting an 
individual to participate in collective action through mobilizing structures, 
which are rooted in a larger context of economic development and political 
structure. 
If stability of this predictive model is assumed, meaning the contextual 
explanation is set aside, which of the two remaining explanations of 
collective action is more reasonable: the anti-state (revolution) interpretation 
or the political resource (reform) interpretation? 
The answer lies somewhere in between those two extremes. Some of 
results support the perspective of collective action as a political resource. 
Participants in collective action are of all ages, of all incomes, and all levels of 
religiosity. As is typical of politically active citizens, they are 
disproportionately male and interested and interested in traditional politics. 
They hold secular/rational values and believe it is important to express one’s 
self. From this, it is possible to imply that they use collective action as a 
means of self-expression. They believe democracy is generally a good 
political system. Taken together, these results suggest collective action is 
generally calls for reform, not revolution. 
Despite the normalized appearance of collective action, participants 
differ from the typical citizen in important ways. They tend to be 
disproportionately drawn from the extreme left of the ideological spectrum 
and they are strongly dissatisfied with both their life and their government. 
Despite holding postmaterialist values, usually associated with happiness, 
unhappy people are far more likely to participate in collective action than 
happy people. While the difficulty of measuring other potential motive 
Participants in 
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incomes, and levels 
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Participants in 
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are strongly 
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sources precludes comparison between motive sources, discontent appears to 
be an effective motive source. 
Traditional mobilizing organizations, such as labor unions and political 
parties, work in concert with nonpolitical civic associations to provide the 
structure for the actualization of participation. The reticence of housewives 
to participate in collective action may be yet another interesting path for 
future research. 
It is clear that culture and history influence participation in collective 
action. While it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from the cultural 
zone measure, it is clear that the willingness to participate differs among 
cultures. Considering the negative effect of higher Human Development 
Index scores and the positive effect of economic growth in tandem, it 
appears as though inhabitants of developing countries are more likely to 
participate in collective action than well-developed or slow-growing nations. 
There are also strong differences between individuals living in countries that 
have experienced communist rule and those who have not. The reticence of 
the former may be the lasting product of non-participative political cultures 
under communist rule. The Freedom House scores’ lack of significance is 
particularly surprising, since it might appear intuitive that countries that have 
strong protections for civil and political liberties would have higher rates of 
participation in collective action. Continued exploration of the relationship 
between collective action and civil and political liberties may be a fruitful area 
for further research. 
 
~*~ 
 
These results largely support the proposed conceptual model, although 
more fine-grained data is necessary to explore how this process works in 
practice. Individuals generally use collective action as a political resource, but 
any attempt to equate collective action with voting, surveys, and other 
measures of public opinion appears misguided. The mere absence of anti-
state sentiment should not be confused with political representativeness. 
Culture and history 
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participation in 
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Participants are far more dissatisfied, ideologically extreme, and likely to hold 
postmaterialist values than the typical citizen.  
Political leaders would be wrong to dismiss demands supported through 
collective action out of hand. The results of this analysis leave little doubt 
that collective action is not simply the domain of minorities and the 
marginalized. Nevertheless, despite that superficial appearance of 
representativeness, the opinions of participants must also represent those of 
the general population if political leaders are to treat collective action as 
analogous to elections or surveys. This does not appear to be so. 
Therefore, collective action should be understood as a tool of reform, 
used by discontented individuals who have not yet given up on the current 
political system. Their dissatisfaction and postmaterialist values mean their 
demands may not align with the desires of the population as a whole. 
Collective action is not a political tool just like all the others. It lies firmly in 
the hands of the loud and the unhappy. 
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IX. APPENDIX 
A.#Original(Survey'Ques%ons!–!World!Values!Survey"
Sex 
 V238 (Code respondent’s sex by observation): 
 1 Male 
 2 Female 
 
Interest in Politics 
V84 How interested would you say you are in politics?  Are you (read out and code one answer): 
 1 Very interested 
 2 Somewhat interested 
 3 Not very interested 
 4 Not at all interested 
 
Political Scale 
V95 In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Code one number): 
Left         Right 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Having a Democratic System 
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of 
governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad 
way of governing this country?  
 Very good Fairly good Fairly bad Very bad 
V130 Having a democratic political system                                                        1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Education 
V246 What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]: 
1 No formal education 
2 Incomplete primary school 
3 Complete primary school 
4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type  
6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
8 Some university-level education, without degree 
9 University-level education, with degree 
Note – the responses to this question were translated onto a four-point scale (0 = none, 1 = primary, 2 
= secondary, 3 = tertiary). 
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Subjective Class 
V236 
People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or 
the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the (read out and code one 
answer): 
1 Upper class 
2 Upper middle class 
3 Lower middle class 
4 Working class 
5 Lower class 
 
Income Scale 
V237 
On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the 
highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your 
household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes that come in. (Code one number): 
Lowest Group         Highest Group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Employment Status 
V249 Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job (code one answer): 
Yes, has paid employment: 
1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more) 
2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week) 
3 Self employed 
No, no paid employment: 
4 Retired/pensioned 
5 Housewife not otherwise employed 
6 Student 
7 Unemployed 
8 Other (write in):______________________ 
 
Age 
V239 Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ (write in last two digits) 
V240 This means you are ____ years old (write in age in two digits). 
 
Civic Associations 
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me 
whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? 
(Read out and code one answer for each organization): 
 Active member Inactive member Don’t belong 
V25 Church or religious organization 2 1 0 
V26 Sport or recreational organization 2 1 0 
V27 Art, music or educational organization 2 1 0 
V28 Labor Union 2 1 0 
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V29 Political party 2 1 0 
V30 Environmental organization 2 1 0 
V31 Professional association 2 1 0 
V32 Humanitarian or charitable organization 2 1 0 
Note – The composite civic activism score was calculated without V25 and V29, as these were analyzed 
separately. The composite score was calculated by summing up a respondent’s answers to V26, V27, 
V28, V30, V31, and V32 where non-membership = 0, inactive membership = 1, and active membership 
= 2. 
 
Importance of God 
V152 How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means “very important” and 1 means “not at all important.” (Code one number): 
Not at all important         Very Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Happiness 
V10 Taking all things together, would you say you are (read out and code one answer): 
1 Very happy 
2 Rather happy 
3 Not very happy 
4 Not at all happy 
 
Confidence in Government 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence 
you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all? (Read out and code one answer for each):  
 A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
V115 The government (in your nation’s capital) 1 2 3 4 
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C.#Table#of#Variables#With#Poten4al#Interac4on#Eﬀects!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
It is probable that there are other interaction effects present in these data, but a comprehensive exploration of this topic is outside 
of the scope of this analysis. 
